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NATURE OF CASE
This is an action commenced by Dahnken Inc. ("Dahnken") under the
provision of 25-5-1, Utah Code Ann. 1953, to set aside a conveyance of real
property from H. Carlton Davis ("Davis") to Harold Wilmarth ("Wilmarth" )as
being void under the Statute of Frauds, 25-1-1, et. seq. Utah Code Ann.
1953.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The Second District Court, Davis County, State of Utah held that the
assignment of a Uniform Real

Estate Contract dated November 2,

1981

("Assignment") covering property located in Bountiful, Utah ("Millbrook
Property"), from Davis to Wilmarth was void and that the conveyance was
to be set aside.

The District Court further held that Davis was the

owner of an agreement dated March 2, 1982 ("March 2 Agreement"), between
Wilmarth and Davis and Clarus, a Utah corporation ("Clarus") and Sherman
B. Hawkes ("Hawkes"), whereby Cl arus and Hawkes agreed to convey certain
lots or pay sums of money which was in part consideration of the sale of
the

Millbrook

Property.

Inasmuch

as

the

Assignment

from

Davis

to

Wilmarth was found to be void, the District Court held that Wilmarth had
no right, title or interest in the March 2 Agreement.

The court further

held that a prior garnishment by Dahnken on Clarus and Hawkes was a
val id and first lien on the March 2 Agreement and that the March 2
Agreement should be sold by the Sheriff of Davis County.

The judgment

of the District Court was made and entered on the 19th day of July,
1983.
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When

reference

is

made

to

abbreviation CR (Court Record)
record

on appeal

and Tr

the

record

throughout

the

brief,

the

shall apply to the first volume of the

(Trial

Transcript)

shall

apply to the trial

transcript in the second volume of the record on appeal.
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff-Respondent seeks to have the judgment sustained on appeal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Statement of Facts set out in Appellant's brief is, in the main
correct.

However, Appellant has omitted or unclearly stated some of the

pertinent facts,

therefore a complete statement of facts

are set out

below.

1.

Defendant Wilmarth

is

has no children of his own.
about 22 years.

(CR 66).

Davis'

stepfather.

(Tr 100).

(Tr 66).

Wilmarth

Davis has been his stepson for

Dahnken made severa 1 attempts to 1ocate Davis

for service of process, however, Davis has left this jurisdiction with
no forwarding address in an effort to avoid such service of process and
actions of his
deposition

of

creditors.
Davis,

(Tr 49).

however,

two

Plaintiff endeavored to take the
different

dates

were

set,

one

in

California and one in Salt Lake City, but Davis did not appear at either
time.

(CR

80,

84).

Wilmarth

claimed

to

be

unsure

of

the

present

location of Davis. (Tr 105).
2.
sold

the

On March 2, 1981, Merrill W. Beck and Marcia D. Beck, his wife,
Mi 11 brook

Property

under

5

a

Uni form

Rea 1

Estate

Contract

(Exhibit A) to Defendant Davis.

Said Millbrook Property is located at

1414 Millbrook Way, Bountiful, Utah 84010.
3.

On November 2, 1981, Defendant Davis executed an Assignment of

the Uniform Real

to

assign

all of his right, title and interest in and to the Uniform Real

Estate

Contract to
and

other

Estate Contract

("Assignment"),

purporting

Defendant Wilmarth for a stated consideration of "$10.00
good

and

valuable

consideration".

(Exhibit

C).

Wilmarth

testified that he did not sign this document, (Tr 91-92) although it was
acknowledged and recorded.

After signing this purported conveyance of

the Millbrook Property to Wilmarth,
property

as

if

it were

his

own

Davis

continued to deal

property.

After

the

with

conveyance

the
to

Wilmarth, Davis used the Millbrook Property as security in securing a
loan

from

Mr.

Arnell

$50,000.00 obligation was
had no interest.
Millbrook Property.

("Heaps")

of

over

$50,000.00.

incurred in a transaction

He also gave Heaps a verbal

This

in which Wilmarth

option to purchase the

Davis represented to Heaps that he was in fact the

owner of the Mi 11 brook
action.

Heaps

Property he

(Tr 34, 35, 36, 37, 38).

used as

security in their trans-

Heaps never knew anything about the

alleged interest of Mr. Wilmarth. (Tr 43).

Davis remained in possession

of the Millbrook Property from November 2, 1981 until March 2, 1982 when
the Millbrook Property was sold to Clarus.

Wilmarth never at any time

took possession of the Millbrook Property nor did he receive any rent
from Davis. (Tr 24, 104).
4.

On

February 5,

1982,

Davis,

as

Seller,

executed

an

Earnest

Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase whereby Davis agreed to se 11

6

the

Millbrook

Property to Hawkes as

Buyer ("Exhibit E").

Davis did not

consult with Wilmarth concerning the terms and conditions of the sale
prior to signing the Earnest Money Agreement.

(Tr 95-96).

The sale of the Millbrook Property was closed on March 2, 1982

5.

with Wilmarth and Davis as purported sellers and Clarus and Hawkes as
Buyers,

(Cl a rus

"Buyers").

and

Hawkes

a re

sometimes

hereafter

referred

to

as

The purchase price was paid by Buyers paying $20 ,000. 00 in

cash and assuming the underlying contract ob 1i gat ion with Merril 1 Beck
in the amount of $129,105.49 and the balance of $98,000.00 was represented by the March 2 Agreement whereby Clarus and Hawkes agreed to
transfer certain
(Exhibit H).

lots

or pay sums

of money

to

Davis

and

Wilmarth,

The Seller's closing statement (Exhibit G) shows a lien

pay-off to Arne 11 Heaps to pay off the Davis obligation to Heaps and a
cash

payment of $15,862.50 in the form of a check made payable to

Wilmarth

(Exhibit Q).

This check was endorsed "Pay to the order of

Wendy F. Whitney" and endorsed by "Harold Wilmarth".
endorsed by Wendy F. Whitney.

The check is also

Sid Davis, no relation, the Real Estate

Broker who handled the sale of the Mill brook Property to Cl arus, and who
had been involved with Davis on other transactions, testified that Wendy
Whitney was either the financee or wife of Davis at the time the check
was

endorsed.

(Tr.

22).

Wilmarth

testified

that

the

signa-

ture-endorsement on the check was not his, (Tr 90) and that he never saw
the check before the trial.

(Tr 95).

ceeds

never went

from

the

Clarus

sale

It is clear that the cash proto

Wilmarth,

but

to

Davis.

Wilmarth also testified that he received a copy of the clos,ing statement
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(Exhibit G) but never inquired of Davis as to what happened to the cash
proceeds. (Tr 97).
6.

On May 17, 1982, Dahnken obtained a judgment against Davis and

New Worlds in Fund Raising Inc.

("New Worlds")

in the Third Judicial

District Court for Salt Lake County, State of Utah,
C-82-33 ("Salt Lake County Judgment").

(CR 13).

Civil

Case No.

On August 4, 1982,

Dahnken issued a Garnishment against Clarus and Hawkes attaching the
March 2 Agreement.
7.
Judicial

On August 17, 1982, Dahnken commenced this action in the Second
Court

in Davis County,

State of Utah

against

Wilmarth

and

Davis, seeking to have the Assignment from Davis to Wilmarth set aside
on the grounds that it was a fraudulent conveyance under the provisions
of 25-1-1 Utah Code Ann. ( 1953), and to have the Garnishment declared a
valid first lien against the March 2 Agreement. (Exhibit H).
8.

It is clear from the evidence that Wilmarth was insolvent when

he signed the Assignment on November 2, 1981.

Heaps testified that of

the $100,000.00 owed to him by Davis, $50,000.00 was paid but $49,750.00
remained unpaid.

(Tr 38).

Dahnken had attached personal

property remaining in the store at

165 South State, Salt Lake City, Utah in August 1981 (CR 117).
Mr.

Edward Arthur gave a full

description of steps taken to try to

collect from New Worlds and Davis involving attachment proceedings and
other efforts by Commercial Security Bank ("CSB").
Arnell

Heaps

explained that

his

collect from Davis (Tr 38-39).

attorney

had made

(Tr 38, 39).
great efforts

Mr.
to

Neither CSB or Mr. Heaps were able to
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locate real property or any other assets owned by Davis.

A full analy-

sis of the facts relating to insolvency of Davis is given under Point I.
Wilmarth in his brief has not controverted the finding of the Court
that Davis was insolvent after he made the Assignment to Wilmarth.

9.

When the time came to sell

the property alleged to have been

conveyed to Wilmarth, it was Davis and not Wilmarth who contra 11 ed the
transaction from the beginning to the end.

Wilmarth admits that he had

nothing to do with the negotiation of the terms or conditions of the
sale.

Wilmarth played no part in what those terms and conditions should

be.

(Tr 95-96).

It was Davis who negotiated and signed all the docu-

In fact,

Davis signed the Earnest Money Agreement to sell the

ments.

Millbrook
Quit

Property as

Claim

Deed

the owner

(Exhibit E).

conveying whatever

Wilmarth only signed a

interest he

had.

Wilmarth

stated

that he never received any of the documents relating to the sale, such
as the Earnest Money Agreement, or the closing statements and the March

2 Agreement until sometime after the sale was consummated.

(Tr 95, 96,

97, 98).

10.
not

Wilmarth gave Davis a Power of Attorney, but this document was

properly

description.

notarized

or

properly

recorded

contained

no

legal

A copy of such Power of Attorney was attached to another

recordable document and was thus recorded.
noted

and

particularly

that

this

Power

of

(Exhibit M).
Attorney

was

Judge Palmer
questionable.

(Tr.-133).
11.

The Assignment of Contract

interest in the subject property.

is an

Assignment of Davis'

(Exhibit C).

9

full

In fact the Real Estate

Agent that handled it explained that Davis insisted it was to be a full
conveyance

of

his

(Tr.-26).

interest.

stated that he didn't have a full
105).

However,

at

trial

Wilmarth

interest in the property,

(Tr 104,

Upon the sale of property both Davis and Wilmarth

documents transferring title.

(Tr 20,

21)

(Exhibit H).

signed

the

The March 2

Agreement gives a 50% interest to Davis and 50% to Wilmarth.

Thus Davis

retained a secret interest in the property despite the full

conveyance

recorded in the recorder's office.
12.

The record is clear that there was no

"Fair Consideration"

(25-1-3 Utah Code Ann. 1953) paid by Wilmarth for the Millbrook Property.

The evidence introduced at the trial

is briefly summarized below.

(A full statement on these facts is made under Point I.)
The facts are not disputed that the "Antecedent Debt" which Defendant argues was the consideration for the Assignment of the Millbrook
Property, [except for $9,100.00 (Exhibit 6)] were the debts and obl igations
Davis.

of 3 corporations
(Exhibits

2,

and

3, 4,

they were
5,

not

7, and 8) .

1

personally
The

quaranteed

by

(Exhibits

16

notes

through 22) were obviously introduced into evidence to try to prove that
Davis

had

a

personal

obligation

to

pay

these

corporate

loans.

An

examination of these notes will indicate that they were all prepared at

1.
It appears that the corporation Econo Optic may have changed its
name to Nutri Vite (Tr 103).

10

the same time, with the same paper and the same ink.

They were never in

the personal possession of Wilmarth but they were mysteriously sent to
Vaughn North the attorney for Davis (one of the attorneys prosecuting this
appeal) apparently after this lawsuit was filed.

(Tr 108-109).

effect of this evidence is fully discussed under Point I.)
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(The

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT ONE:

THE EVIDENCE FULLY SUPPORTS THE FINDING BY THE TRIAL COURT

THAT THE CONVEYANCE BY ASSIGNMENT OF CONTRACT OF NOVEMBER 2, 1981, FROM
DAVIS TO WILMARTH WAS A FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE PURSUANT TO SECTION 25-1-4
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED IN THAT IT WAS A CONVEYANCE BY AN INSOLVENT PARTY TO
ANOTHER WITHOUT FAIR CONSIDERATION.
POINT TWO:

TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN REFUSING TO ADMIT PERSONAL

CHECKS EXHIBITS 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 8, WRITTEN BY WILMARTH TO CORPORATIONS
OTHER THAN DAVIS AS IRRELEVANT AND IMMATERIAL AND BECAUSE ON THEIR FACE
THEY ARE NOT THE PERSONAL OBLIGATION OF DAVIS.
POINT THREE:

EVIDENCE DOES SUPPORT A FINDING BY THE TRIAL THAT THE

CONVEYANCE BY ASSIGNMENT OF CONTRACT OF NOVEMBER 2, 1981, FROM DAVIS TO
WILMARTH
CODE

WAS

A FRAUDULENT

ANNOTATED,

1953,

CONVEYANCE

BECAUSE

SAID

PURSUANT
CONVEYANCE

TO

SECTION

WAS

MADE

25-1-7
WITH

UTAH

ACTUAL

INTENT TO HINDER, DELAY, AND DEFRAUD CREDITORS.
POINT ONE
POINT ONE:

THE EVIDENCE FULLY SUPPORTS THE FINDING BY THE TRIAL COURT

THAT THE CONVEYANCE BY ASSIGNMENT OF CONTRACT OF NOVEMBER 2, 1981, FROM
DAVIS TO WILMARTH WAS A FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE PURSUANT TO SECTION 25-1-4
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED IN THAT IT WAS A CONVEYANCE BY AN INSOLVENT PARTY TO
ANOTHER WITHOUT FAIR CONSIDERATION.
The app l f cable sections of the Utah Fraudulent Conveyances Act a re
25-1-4- and 25-1-7 U.C.A. 1953, Utah Code Ann. if Plaintiff has proved the
essentfal elements under efther of these sections, it must prevail in this
appeal.
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Mr. Justice Wolfe in Stanley v Stanley 97 Utah 520, 94 P.2d 465, 470,
(1939), stated that the rule, with respect to the duty of the Supreme Court
in review of an Equity case, was as follows:
"Our duty is to make an independent
of the record. If
after that we find
(1) The preponderance of the evidence supports the trial court's
findings of fact, or
to where the preponderance
(2) If there is doubt in our minds
lies, or
(3) We think the evidence as revealed by the record may slightly
preponderate against its coricludions but such preponderance may well
be offset in favor of his conclusions by having seen the witnesses and
been able to judge by their demeanor as to their credibility, then we
wi 11 not reverse."
See also Boccalero v Bee, 102 Utah 12, 126 P.2d 1063, (1942).
We feel

the court wi 11 find the evidence clearly preponderates in

favor of the Plaintiff in this action.
In addition in a case under the Fraudulent Conveyances Act where only
a nominal consideration (as in this case) is indicated in the conveyance,
or the conveyance is to

a near relative the Burden of Proof is on the

grantee to prove sufficient consideration and good faith.

The court stated

in Lund v Howell, 92 Utah 232, 67 P.2d 215, 217, (1937), as follows:
" ... where a conveyance showing nominal consideration leaves a debtor
unab 1e to pay his debts, the burden is upon the grantee to show
sufficient consideration and good faith; and where a conveyance is to
a near relative, in a creditor's suit, the burden of showing good
faith is on the grantee." Paxton v Paxton, 80 Utah 540, 15 P.2d 1051,
(1932)
In Fraudulent Conveyance cases, the Utah Supreme Court has consistently stated that conveyances between close relatives are subject to a test of
rigid scrutiny.

See Paxton v. Paxton, 80 Utah 540, 15 P.2d 1051, (1932);

13

Lund v. Howell, 92 Utah 232, 67 P.2d 215, (1937);

Givan v Lambeth 10 Utah

2d 287, 351 P. 2d 959, (1960); Ned J. Bowman Company v White, 13 Utah 173,
368 P.2d 962, {1962); Road Runner Inn, Inc. v Merrill, 605 P.2d 776, {Utah
1980).

It should be noted that merely because a transaction is between

close relatives, does not alone make a conveyance fraudulent.
must

be determined

on

its

own

facts

and

circumstances,

Each case
taking

into

consideration the purpose of the statute.
Section 25-1-4, U.C.A. 1953 states:
"Conveyances by insolvent.
Every conveyance made, and every
obligation incurred, by a person which is, or will be thereby rendered, insolvent is fraudulent as to creditors, without regard to his
actual intent, if the conveyance is made or the obligation is incurred
without a fair consideration."
Mr. Justice Ellett in construing this statute stated the three essential elements that must be proved:
"Both the statute and case law interpreting the statute make it clear
that subjective or actual intent to defraud are not elements of a
fraudulent conveyance claim. Me er is obl i ated to show onl (1 that
she was a creditor of GAC; 2 that G C was insolvent at the time the
conve ance was ma e to erra; and 3 that the conve a nee was not
even for a fair consideration .
Emphasis added . Meyer v Genera
erican Corp., 569 P.2d 1094, (Utah 1977).
(a)

Creditor

That Dahnken was a creditor of Davis is indicated by the judgment
entered in the Third Judicial District Court, Case No. C82-33, entered on
May 17, 1982 in the amount of $65,000.00. (CR 6, Transcript of judgment
filed with Exhibits, see also Tr 94).
(b) Insolvency
Defendant Wilmarth, in his brief, has not disputed that Davis was
insolvent, therefore, this point is probably not at issue.
are briefly stated below.
14

But the facts

In rendering his decision, Judge Palmer stated:
"I find that there was an intent to hinder and defraud and delay
creditors, and it's great financial embarrassment. The actual testimony of Mr. Ar.thur and more, at least substantiated by Mr. Cazier, is
they were having problems with him. They had to, they consolidated
the $100,000 to $250,000. The wanted more secured position. They
demanded more payments and more security because it was late and his
assets were found not to be enough to warrant the debt to the corporation, or to the individual." (Tr 134).
Judge Palmer made the following Findings of Fact:
"The Assignment of November 2, 1981 from Davis to Wilmarth was issued
without a fair consideration; at the time Davis executed the Assignment, Davis was insolvent or became insolvent by reason of the conveyance; and the said Assignment was made with actual intent to hinder,
delay and defraud creditors. (CR 127).
This finding is supported by ample evidence.

15-1-2 U.C.A. 1953

Defines insolvency as follows:
"A Person is insolvent when the present fair salable value of his
assets is less than the amount that will be required to satisfy his
probable liability on his existing debts as they become absolute and
matured."
Judge Ellett in the Meyer case cited above stated: (page 1096):
"The level of insolvency necessary to meet the statute requirement is
not insolvency in the bankruptcy sense but merely a showing that the
party's assets are not sufficient to meet liabilities as they become
due."
It is clear that Davis made the assignment (Exhibit C) at the time
when his financial affairs were caving in and that he clearly knew that he
would not have sufficient assets to meet his liabilities.

Since none of

his other creditors were able, after extensive search, to find other
assets, the Mi 11 brook Property represented the last physical asset Davis
had.

At the time the assignment was made he was clearly unable to meet his

obligations as they came due.

15

The Assignment (Exhibit C) was executed at a time when several creditors were threatening law suits to enforce their debts against Davis which
were outstanding and delinquent.

For instance, it was in November of 1981

that New Worlds owed an amount of $250,000.00 or thereabouts, to CSB. (Tr
47,48).

Davis was a personal guarantor to the loan for $100,000.00.

CSB,

in November, 1981, attached all of the property, primarily personal property, that it could find belonging to New Worlds in an effort to satisfy the
outstanding obligation.

(Tr 48, 49 and 50).

In addition to this amount,

Mr. Davis owed CSB an additional $20,000.00 (Tr 50) and he owed Dahnken
over $69,878.00 (CR 6).

Davis owed

Mr.

Arnell

Heaps approximately

$50,000.00 on one loan and approximately $49,750.00 on two other obligations which he had not paid. (Tr 34, 35, 37, 38, 39).
Mr. Edward Arthur, Vice President of CSB testified that a renewal loan
was made to New Worlds which was guaranteed personally by Davis.

The note

was dated August 14, 1981 for $250,000.00 and became due November 15, 1981
(Tr 48).

Mr. Arthur testified that CSB was very concerned about payment

and the purpose of the renewal loan was to obtain additional security in
the form of inventory and real property.
testified:

Upon cross examination Mr. Arthur

(Tr 129,130, 131) as follows:

"Q. Thank you.
It's correct is it not Mr. Arthur, that if in any
event in August of 1981 the bank was willing to make a $250,000.00
loan to Mr. Davis; is that correct?
A. May I make this comment? Based on thirty-five years in lending
money, when a lender has already put money out and is having difficulty collecting it, the options it has at that point are limited. When
we renewed the $100,000.00 and the $150,000.00 notes into one note,
our effort was to seek a liquidation program and some security.
Q. May I ask you this, Mr. Arthur, is that disclosed by your records
that that was the reason for making the $250,000.00 loan of credit in
August?
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A. Clearly.
Q. Do you have that with you, that would indicate that?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. Now you indicated that when, in the banking business that this is
done becaus_e
collection difficulties did you say? Am I quoting
you? You indicated that you make new loans available in order to,
ahh, correct some collection difficulties or something to that effect.
Do I have that correct?
A. I think you have stated it reasonably clear, counselor.
In the vernacular when you are casing (Casy) in the drink, you
try to bail yourself out.
Q.
Tell me now, what event took place prior to 1981 that told you
that loan was not going to be paid back, or that the loans that had
been made to that point were not going to be paid back?
A. Other than repayment of the letters of credit that, or the notes
that underwrote the letters of credit, which Mr. Cazier testified to,
and I emphasize possible existence of one or the other, Mr. Davis had
been tardy in
and his note was the, ahh, the $150,000.00
note was not past due as was the $100,000.00 note. We were striving
a way to get ours secured.
When the loan officer presented the request for the $250,000.00
renewal, the loan report form, which, the original of which I have in
my hand, discloses that we were to have a filing on accounts receivable and inventory evidencing a security interest in those assets.
When the 1oan officer came to the 1oan committee, and I am a
member of that loan committee, he was clearly instructed that we
wanted to have additional security in the form of realty.
Q. But isn't it true too that there was an additional amount lent to
Mr. Davis of some $100,000.00?
A. There was no additional money advanced when we renewed the notes.
There were two notes in existence; one was a $100,000.00 note which
was the residua 1 of the Dahnken ob 1i gation. And there was another
obligation for $150,000.00 to New Worlds in Fundraising. Those two
notes were combined into the one note for $250,000.00
I never learned clearly why the loan officer was not able to get
the real estate as security as he was instructed.
Q. But the loan committee felt comfortable with going ahead at any
rate, is that not true?
A. I would have to say at this point that we felt very uncomfortable.
That's why we sought additional collateral."
Sometime between November 1, 1981 and November 25, 1981 Mr. Arthur
testified that Davis turned over the merchandise of the store to CSB.

This

1.
The record states "not past due" but the context of the statement
indicates he intended to say "was past due".
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merchandise was sold, which left an obligation of $103,566.42 plus a
$20,000.00 personal note (Tr 49) which were eventually written off.

He

also testified that all efforts to find other assets and real property of
New Worlds or Davis were without success.

(Tr 49).

It is interesting that CSB extended the New World - Davis loan on
August 15, 1981 with the intent to obtain additional security in the form
of accounts recei vab 1e, inventory and rea 1 property.

For some reason the

real property was never given as security but on November 2, 1981, Davis
assigned all his right, title and interest in the Millbrook Property to his
step father, Wilmarth.

This occurred at about the same time that CSB

-

foreclosed on the inventory, and Dahnken had previously commenced suit and
attached the inventory remaining at 145 South State Street, Salt Lake City,
Utah

(Tr 117).
When a conveyance is made at a time when the granter is heavily

indebted, there is a presumption that the conveyance is fraudulent.

In a

recent Arizona case, Zellerback Paper Company v Valley National Bank,
Arizona, Court of Appeals 477 P.2d 550, 554, (1970) the rule was stated as
follows:
"Having been in debt on September 7, 1965, under the circumstances
shown, and obviously unable to retire its liabilities which, as
reflected 1n the June statement, amounted to $112,473.40, the corporation can be presumed to have been insolvent when it undertook to
guarantee and secure Ackerman's debts. Confronted with the same issue
in Feist v Druckerman, 70 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1934), the court there
stated: ' ... (A) Voluntary (emphasis theirs) conveyance made when the
grantor is indebted is presumptively fraudulent. We think this means
that, if one indebted makes such a transfer, it is presumed, (emphasis
ours) in the absence of some proof to the contrary, that he was then
insolvent ... 70 F.2d at 334'".
Wilmarth did not overcome this presumption.
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The only evidence offered by Defendant that Davis was solvent was by
Mr. Stephen Cazier, who worked under the direction of Mr. Edward Arthur at
CSB (he was not an employee of the bank at the time he testified).

Mr.

Cazier stated that he based his opinion on financial statements of Davis
that were in the bank's files. (Tr 114).

On redirect examination, Mr.

Edward Arthur testified that the only financial statement of Mr. Davis in
the bank's file was undated (with a pencil notation of September 30, 1980)
and that such statement would not necessarily indicate the true financial
picture of Mr. Davis a year and a half later. (Tr 126).
Respondents do not dispute the fact, that a transfer or mortgage of
property made to a near relative in consideration of past due indebtedness,
may constitute a non-fraudulent conveyance.

However, it must be shown that

the debt is genuine and the purpose of the mortgage debtor is honest, and
that he was acting in good faith.
1063, (1942;

Boccalero v. Bee, 1D2 Utah 12, 126 P.2d

Paxton V Paxton, 80 Utah 540, 15 p.2d 1051, (1932).

The

Defendant did not show that there was in fact a good faith and fair consideration by clear and convincing evidence.
(c) Fair Consideration
Fair Consideration is defined by the statute as follows:
25-1-3, U.C.A., 1953, as amended:
"Fair consideration. - Fair consideration is given for property, or
obligation:
.
.
.
(1) When in exchange for such property, or obl1gat1on, as a fair
equivalent therefor, and in good faith, property is conveyed or an
antecedent debt is satisfied; or,
(2) When such property or obligation, is received in good faith
to secure a present advance or antecedent debt in amount not dispro-
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portionately small when compared with the value of the property or
obligation obtained." (Emphasis added).
We are concerned here whether or not Wilmarth met the burden of
proving that Davis was indebted to him.

Clearly this burden was not met.

Wilmarth testified that he loaned money to Davis "and his businesses"
over a long period of time. (Tr 66, 67).

To substantiate these loans, a

series of seven personal checks amounting to approximately $97,000.00 were
offered into evidence.

(Exhibits 2 through 8).

were made payable to Econo Optic, a corporation.

Exhibit 2, 3, 4, and 5
Three of these checks are

endorsed by Econo Optic, by someone other than Davis, and one was endorsed
by Econo Optic and by Davis, made payable to another company.
was made payable to Davis.

6

Exhibit 7 was made payable to "Mother's Food

for Hea 1th" and endorsed by Mother's Food for Hea 1th.

Exhibit 8 was made

payable to Nutri Vite and endorsed by Nutri Vite.
Exhibit 6 was received into evidence but Exhibits 2, 3, 4, 5, 7 and 8
were not received into evidence.

(Tr 78).

In an apparent attempt to es tab 1i sh that Davis had made a persona 1
guaranty on these loans, a series of promissory notes, (Exhibit 16.through
22) were offered and received in evidence.

An examination of these prom-

issory notes will indicate that each note carefully corresponds to the date
and amount of one of the checks, Exhibits 2 through 8.

All appear to be on

the same paper, the same ink, and the same typewriter.

It appears obvious

that all of the notes were prepared and executed at the same time.

It also

appears that a blank form note was first prepared and copied, and then the
information from the corresponding check was filled in the blank spaces.
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Wilmarth testified that he had never at any time had these promissory notes
in his possession and that they had been delivered mysteriously, apparently
after this suit was filed, to Mr. Vaughn North, the attorney who had
represented Davis over a period of years and a member of the firm who is
conducting this appeal. (Tr 108-109).

He also testified that the notes

were signed and prepared at a later date than the date indicated on the
note. (Tr 81-82).
The court was also suspicious of these promissory notes.

The court

stated:
"This (referring to the notes, Exhibits 16-22) is all hatched up and
sent to •.. and I say hatched up, I don't know (when, where) these
things were written but they are all identically the same which would
be extremely unusual over the years." (Tr 133).
The notes (Exhibits 16 through 22) are in variance with the notes
(Exhibits 10 through 13).

Wilmarth testified that the latter notes were

given for the obligations represented by the checks (Exhibits 2, 3, 4, and
5).

The difference in the amount of the notes, as compared to the checks,

apparently is interest which has been charged in advance and added to the
face amount of the note.
dates on the checks.

(Tr 75-76).

The dates roughly correspond to the

Where the business is being conducted by mail it was

highly unlikely that the dates on the notes would correspond exactly to the
dates on the checks.

These notes (Exhibits 10 through 13) together with

the supporting testimony of Wilmarth establishes that the checks (Exhibits
2, 3, 4, and 5) were debts of the corporation and not personally guaranteed
by Davis.

This is further supported by the testimony of Wilmarth who

carefully explained the business purpose of most of the loans.
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The

$18,000.00 loan to Nutri Vite (Exhibit 8) was to enable the vitamin company,

had made a large sale, to buy the vitamins to cover the sale.

(Tr 72).
The loans to Econo Optic were for the purchase of furniture, fixtures
and equipment to open new stores.

(Tr 72-74).

The promissory note (Exhib-

it 13) pledges certain furniture, equipment and fixtures as collateral.
The purpose of the only check made out personally to Davis is also explained:
"This (Exhibit 7) is a loan in March '77 for $9,100.00 that I wrote to
him because he was blackballed, ahh, he was owing some money and he
had to pay it." (Tr 73).
That these were business investments is further indicated by the
promissory notes, (Exhibits 10, 11, and 12), which show an investment in
the corpora ti on Econo Optic with the right to convert the obligation to
stock of the corporation.

The testimony of Wilmarth that he went to

California and worked in the vitamin store for a year without pay further
indicates a business investment he was trying to protect.
Wilmarth testified:
"Q. Were most of your business transactions confined to lending money
to Mr. Davis?
A. Business, yes. Ahh, except for one time in a vitamin company, I
went to California, that's why I lived in California, ahh, trying to
keep the business solvent and his partner out of his hair. They were
50 - 50 partners and couldn't make a decision and I eventually found
out the partner was stealing from him and taking kickbacks when I took
over his job there. Other than that, it's been, ahh, ahh, I haven't
been wfth his business." (Tr 67).

Wilmarth testified that Davis had an obligation to pay back principal
plus twelve percent interest.

(Tr 72).

However, the notes, Exhibits 16

through 22, provide for interest at 10% per annum.
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Appellants argue it is only logical that the checks for loans to Davis
be made out to the businesses because that was the purpose for which the
loan was made.

We think it more logical that the checks were made out to

the person or entity which owed the debt.

It seems clear that the original

intent and understanding of Wilmarth and Davis was that the loans were
corporation obligations only.

It is apparent that Davis never considered

the obligation to Wilmarth as his personal debt as he did not show it as an
obligation on his personal Financial Statement which he delivered to the
CSB (Tr 125, 128-129) and if Wilmarth really thought he was the owner of
the Millbrook Property why didn't he show the proceeds of the sale in his
1981 income tax return, or why did he not make a demand for payment in over
20 years?

(Tr 99).

Also it does not seem logical that Wilmarth would make

one check out to Davis (Exhibit 6) and the others to the corporations if in
fact such checks were all loans to Davis and not the corporations.
The Appellant claims that the various companies were just an alter ego
of Davis.

But no evidence to support the "Alter Ego" theory was introduced

at trial nor was this argument raised in the pleadings or in argument
during the trial.

Any claim that the corporations were in fact the alter

ego of Davis would be directly inconsistent with Wilmarth's testimony.
In any event the documentation introduced into evidence shows only a
debt of approximately $10,000.00 as an obligation owed by Davis to
Wilmarth. (Exhibits 6 through 14).

Exhibit 14 is not supported by a check.

Certainly, an antecedent debt of $10,000.00 is not the fair equivalent or
good faith equivalent for $100,000.00 in equity of real property.

All

other evidence of debt has not been shown to be good faith by cl ear and
convincing evidence.
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It has been held by many courts that the discharge of another's debt
does not constitute fair consideration for a conveyance by one who is not
legally responsible for payment of debt.
245 P.2d 1059, (1952);

Hansen v Cramer, 39 Cal .2d 321,

In the Hansen case, the Supreme Court of California

set aside a conveyance as a fraudulent where a wife's separate property was
conveyed in satisfaction of a husbands business debt. The Court stated
(page 1060):
"Fair consideration" is defined by section 3439.03 of the Civil Code
as the exchange of property or the satisfaction of an antecedent debt
which is the "fair equivalent" of the property conveyed. However, the
antecedent debt alleged in support of the conveyance must be a legally
enforceable obligation of the grantor, and the discharge of the debt
of another does not within the meaning of the Fraudulent Convefuance
Act, constitute a fair consideration for a conveyance by one w o is
not res pons i b1e therefor. (Neumeyer v Weinberger, 236 Wis 534, 295
N.W. 775, 776, (1941); 30 A.L.R. 2d 1209, and cases cited.)
The court also stated (page 1060):
"What constitutes 'a fair equivalent' or 'a fair consideration' under
the Fraudulent Conveyance Act must be determined from the standpoint
of creditors. The debtor might be satisfied to give his assets to a
stranger or to exchange them for some worthwhile chattel. But the law
will not permit him to do so if he thereby renders himself uncollectible to the detriment of his creditors."
This matter has not been presented to this court previously, as far as
we are able to determine but all courts which have ruled on the issue are
unanimous.

In an A.L.R. annotation on this subject it is stated:

"No case within the scope of this annotation has been discovered
wherein the court has upheld a transaction the consideration for which
was the discharge of an antecedent debt owed by one other than the
granter, as based on 'fair consideration' under the Uniform Fraudulent
Conveyance Act."
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In the Zellerback Paper Company case, sited above, a 1970 Arizona
Court of Appeals case, 477, P.2d 550, the court ruled that the personal
debt of the corporation's sole stockholder was not to be considered in
determining if fair consideration was given.

The court said:

"There was no 'present advance'. The corporation's only 'antecedent
debt' to the bank was the $11,000. The $47,500 personal debt of
Ackerman is not to be considered in deciding whether West-Coast
received fair consideration. The $47,500 Ackerman debt is neither a
'present advance' nor an 'antecedent debt' of West Coast.
This Court also held that the $11,000 debt of West Coast to the bank
was disproportionately small for the granting of a mortgage on property
valued at $25,000.

The mortgage was therefore declared to be fraudulent.

In our case, Davis' separate property can not be conveyed in satisfaction for the business debt of Econo-Optics, Mother's Food for Health, and
Nutri Vite.

POINT TWO
POINT TWO:

TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN REFUSING TO ADMIT PERSONAL

CHECKS EXHIBITS 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 8, WRITTEN BY WILMARTH TO CORPORATIONS
OTHER THAN DAVIS AS IRRELEVANT AND IMMATERIAL AND BECAUSE ON THEIR FACE
THEY ARE NOT THE PERSONAL OBLIGATION OF DAVIS.
The trial court refused to admit the checks of Wilmarth made payable
to corporations other than Davis as evidence of Davis' indebtedness on the
grounds that such checks are illlllaterial and irrelevant.

(Tr 77).

However,

such checks were in fact admitted into evidence orally by the testimony of
Wilmarth.

(Tr 71 though 75).

Wilmarth testified as to each check by

reading the writing on the face of each check.

He described to whom each

check was made payable, the date and the amount of each check.
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Wilmarth

also testified at that time as to the terms and purpose of the loans for
which each check was given.

In addition Wilmarth testified that the payees

upon the checks were companies which Davis allegedly owned. (Tr 71-75).
These checks, (Exhibits 2, 3, 4, 5, 7 and 8) are not material because
they are made out to entities other than Davis.

Testimony of Wilmarth that

the checks represent the debt of someone other than the payee is self
serving and hearsay and contradicts the great Weight of Evidence.

The

materiality of these checks is weakened further by the fact that the
supporting promissory notes, admitted as evidence, (Exhibits 10, 11, 12,
and 13) clearly indicate the corporate responsibility to pay the obligation
rather than being the personal obligations of Davis.
If it were admitted for purposes of argument that it was error not to
admit these checks, this error does not constitute reverseable error
because the trial court had before it the evidence of these checks in full
when it made its judgment.

The introduction of the promissory notes

(Exhibits 16 through 22) was a greater error since no foundation was laid
for their introduction and they were clearly hearsy yet even with these
notes in evidence the court could not find for the Defendant.

The intro-

duction of the physical documents would not have changed the trial courts
opinion in light of the other evidence.
POINT THREE
POINT THREE:

EVIDENCE DOES SUPPORT A FINDING BY THE TRIAL THAT THE

CONVEYANCE BY ASSIGNMENT OF CONTRACT OF NOVEMBER 2, 1981, FROM DAVIS TO
WILMARTH WAS A FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE PURSUANT TO SECTION 25-1-7 UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED, 1953, BECAUSE SAID CONVEYANCE WAS MADE WITH ACTUAL INTENT TO
HINDER, DELAY, AND DEFRAUD CREDITORS.
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Under Section 25-1-4 Utah Code Ann.
above,

"subjective or actual

conveyance claim.

1953, discussed under Point I

intent" a re not elements of a fraudulent

Section 25-1-7 U.C.A. (1953) reads as follows:

"Conveyance to hinder, delay, defraud creditors. - Every conveyance
made, and every obligation incurred, with actual intent, as distinguished from intent presumed in law, to hinder, delay or defraud
either present or future creditors is fraudulent as to both present
and future creditors."
Under 25-1-7 Utah Code Ann.

(1953)

"intent" of the parties is an

element that must be proved before a fraudulent conveyance can be shown.
Actual intent must be shown rather than mere intent presumed in law.

In

our case, there has been a plethora of fact indicating the fraudulent
intent.

The court stated:

"The court has considerable difficulty finding that there was not a
fraud.
I think there was a fraud.
I think it was an intentional
fraud." (Tr 133).
In his brief, Wilmarth relies heavily on the following statement of
Judge Palmer:
"I think Wilmarth came into it sadly enough, maybe totally genuine."
The full statement made by Judge Palmer while rendering this decision
is as fol lows:
"I think Wilmarth came into it sadly enough, maybe totally genuine.
have some question. I think some handwriting experts could
us a
lot of things on this handwriting. I'm not one, but certainly the
check signed by Mr. Wilmarth doesn't relate to any of these
he
now says are his, including the Quit Claim Deed. So there is some
real question here." (Emphasis added, Tr 135).
In a Fraud case and especially where the conveyance is to a near
relative, the burden of proof is on the Grantee to show good faith.
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It is

clear that Judge Palmer did not feel that Wilmarth had met his burden of
proof.
Proof of actual fraud is not required.
ca 11 ed "Badges of Fraud".

Fraud is proved by the so

These do not necessarily constitute fraud, but

are signs or indicia from which the existence of fraud may be inferred as a
matter of evidence.
The term "Badges of Fraud" evidently first arose in the very early
Twayne's Case, a Star Chamber case decided in 1601.

(cited by Justice

Crockett in Givan v Lamberth, 10 Utah 2d 287, 351 P.2d 959, 961, (1960):
"The Debtor Pierce owed Twyne 400 pounds and was sued by a third party
for 200 pounds. Before trial Pierce conveyed all of his property to
Twyne reciting as consideration the prior debt. But he continued in
possession, sold some of the sheep and evidenced all of the prerequisite of ownership. The conveyance was set aside as fraudulent, the
court assigning the following reasons, which have often since been
referred to as the badges of fraud: that in the conveyance Pierce
reserved nothing even for his own use even though he continued in
possession and used the property as his own; that this evidenced a
secret trust between the parties; that the conveyance was made pending
the suit; and was kept secret; and finally that the conveyance itself
"protested too much" in reciting that it was made "honestly, truly,
and bona fide."
Most of these same Badges of Fraud exist in this case and many others,
as we will indicate.

An interesting comment is made by Justice McDonaugh

in the case of Cardon v Harper, 106 Utah 560, 151 P.2d 99, 101, (1944):
"Whether consideration be treated as a detriment to one or a benefit
to the other, the fact is that after the manipulation of funds took
pl ace, and after the deed and bi 11 of sale were executed, both the
properties and the funds were used in substantially the same manner
and for substantially the same purposes as they would have been had
these questioned transations never occurred, as far as granter and
grantee were concerned."
This is almost an exact description of what happened in this case.

As

we follow the paper trail and the oral evidence admitted at the trial the
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fo 11 owing is a ch rono logical sequence of events concerning the Mill brook

Property:
1.

On March 23, 1981, Davis purchased the Millbrook Property under

Uniform Real Estate Contract, (Exhibit A).
2.

On November 2, 1981, Davis assigned all of his right, title and

interest in the property to Wilmarth for nominal consideration.

Wilmarth

did not sign the Assignment and did not see it until after the law suit was
filed.
3.

(Exhibit C, Tr 69)
On or about November 24, 1981, Davis borrowered $50,000.00 from

Arne l Heaps and the Mill brook Property was assigned by Davis to Heaps as
security for the Loan.

(Exhibit D, see Limited Assignment of Contract

attached to Exhibit D).

At the same time Davis gave Heaps a verbal option

to purchase the property. (Tr 36).

Davis at no time ever mentioned to

Heaps that he had already assigned the Millbrook Property to Wilmarth. (Tr
33, 34, 35, 36, 37).

Wilmarth did not know that Davis had used the

Millbrook Property as security for a $50,000.00 loan or that Heaps was
given a verbal option to purchase the Millbrook Property.
4.

On February 5, 1982, Davis (not Wilmarth), signed an Earnest Money

Agreement as seller, and Sherman B. Hawkes, as Buyer (Exhibit E) offering
to se 11 the Mill brook Property to Hawkes.

Davis did not at any time

discuss with Wilmarth the terms and conditions of the sale or whether the
sale should be made.

Wilmarth knew nothing of the sale until after it was

closed. (Tr 95).
5.

The sale was closed on March 2, 1982.

esting points about the sale:
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There were several inter-

a.

All of the documents, except the Quit Claim Deed, are signed

by Davis in his personal capacity or by Davis as attorney in fact for
Wilmarth.

The Power of Attorney was not properly acknowledged and was not

properly recorded and did not contain a legal description of the property.
(Exhibit 15).

Judge Palmer stated:

"The Power of Attorney is certainly

questionable."
b.

Part of the purchase price was paid by the March 2 Agreement,

(Exhibit H).

This March 2 Agreement shows that Davis is a one half owner

in the lots or money to be delivered or paid by Clarus.
Real

Estate Broker testified that Davis'

under the specific instructions of Davis.
least the half owner of the property.

Sid Davis, the

name was put on the agreement
Davis considered himself at

(Tr 20-21).

The assignment there-

fore created a Secret Interest of Davis in the Millbrook Property.
c.

As indicated on the closing statement, part of the proceeds

of sale were paid to Heaps as final
Heaps.

settlement of Davis'

obligation to

(Tr 38, Exhibit G).
d.

A check in the amount of $15,562.50 was issued to Wilmarth as

the balance of the proceeds of sale, (Exhibit Q).

Wilmarth testified that

he never saw this check and that the endorsement was a forgery (Tr 87-88).
Sid Davis testified that the endorsee, Windy Whitney, was the fiancee or
wife of Davis at this time.
funds.

(Tr 21-11).

Davis obviously received these

Wilmarth testified that he received copies of the closing state-

ments and other closing documents but never inquired about where the funds
went.
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e.

After the Assignment to Wilmarth on November 2, 1981, Davis

continued in possession of the Millbrook Property and paid no rent to
Wilmarth until March 2, 1982, when it was sold to Clarus.
f.

(Tr 104-5).

The Assignment of November 2, 1981 is a full assignment of

all of Davis' right, title and interest in the Millbrook Property, yet he
obviously retained a secret interest in the Millbrook Property as indicated
by (Exhibit H), and the testimony of Wilmarth (Tr 105) and this assignment
prevented most of Davis' creditors from discovering the property.
g.

Wilmarth conveyed his interest by a Quit Claim Deed instead

of by the usual Warranty Deed.

This caused Judge Palmer to comment:

"The fact that if the Defendant here had this property in his own
right, he would have conveyed by Warranty Deed and not by Quit Claim
Deed which just gives something, if he has something ... " (Tr 133).
h.

Davis did not indicate an obligation to Wilmarth in his

financial statement delivered to CSB (Tr 125)
i.

Wilmarth, as the purported owner of the Mi 11 brook Property

did not report the proceeds of sale in his 1982 income tax return. (Tr 104)
Wilmarth, in his brief, has argued that he was innocent of wrong
doing.

In this case Wilmarth did not prove that he paid a fair consid-

eration for the property and therefore he is not a bona fide purchaser for
value and he cannot take advantage of the provision of 25-1-13 U.C.A. 1953
which states:
"Bona fide purchasers not affected. - The prov1s1ons of this chapter
shal 1 not be construed to affect or impair the title of a purchaser
for a valuable consideration, unless it appears that such purchaser
had previous notice of the fraudulent intent of his immediate grantor,
or of the fraud rendering void the title of such grantor."
The annotation at 17 A.L.R. 1209, (1953), in its introduction states:
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"I. In general. Although there is
diff.erence of_ opinion
upon other questions affecting the validity as against creditors of
voluntary conveyances or transfers, i.e., conveyances or transfers not
supported by a valuable considerati?n• the c?urts, as presently
are practically unanimous to the point
if the rule of the
ular jurisdiction, as regards a showing of actual or constructive
fraud on the part of the grantor or transferrer, is satisfied, a
voluntary conveyance or transfer is avoided as to creditors; and it is
inmaterial whether or not the grantee or transferee participated in or
knew of the fraud of the grantor or transferrer, or of the facts and
circumstances from which fraud is imputed to the latter."

On the other hand, there is no question that Wilmarth did participate
in the fraud for the following reasons:
Wilmarth admits that he did not acquire a full interest in the property (Tr 105), and the agreement of March 1, (Exhibit H) shows a 50% interest
remaining in Davis.

Thus a secret trust was created in Wilmarth.

The minute Wilmarth received a full conveyance of the property, where
the clear intent is for Davis to retain a large interest, he has participated in the fraud.

He may claim he didn't know about it but he either

intentionally or unintentionally became a part of the fraud and this fraud
prevented creditors from finding the real property.
Most of the above Badges of Fraud (or actual fraud), are tied to
Wilmarth as well as to Davis, Wilmarth did not act as the owner of the
Property.

Davis, at all times, took actions, made conveyances, received

money, paid his personal debts from the proceeds, as if he were the owner
of the property.

On the other hand, Wilmarth, at all times, acted as a

party who was holding title for somebody else, but did not consider himself
the owner.

If Wilmarth was the rea 1 owner of the property, he was on

notice, at least a prudent man would have been on notice, that his step son
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was defrauding him in the transaction, but Wilmarth was not at all concerned.
The burden is on Wilmarth to prove his own good faith, as well as the
good faith of Davis.

He did not meet this burden.
CONCLUSION

The Plaintiff Dahnken is entitled to prevail under either 25-1-4

or

25-1-7 U.C.A. 1953.
The preponderance of the evidence shows:
(a)

Davis was indebted to Dahnken.

(b)

Davis was insolvent at the time he executed the Assignment

of Contract.
(c)

The alleged antecedent debt was not the obligation of Davis

but of the three corporations and Davis was not personally obligated
thereon.
(d)

The debt of approximately $10,000.00 is not fair consid-

eration for the transfer of an equity in real property of approximately
$100,000.00.
Plaintiff can also prevail under 25-1-7.
to hinder delay or defraud creditors.

There is obviously an intent

The "Badges of Fraud" cited above

are too closely connected to Wilmarth for him to say he is innocent of any
wrong doing and he participated in the Fraud by accepting title but
al lowing Davis to retain a secret 50% interest in the proceeds.

Since a

fair consideration was not paid he cannot stand in the position of a bona
fide Purchaser for Value.
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The failure to admit the checks (Exhibits 2, 3, 4, 5, 7 and 8) was not
error, but even if it was error all of the evidence relating to the checks
was before the court when he made his decision.

Therefore Plaintiff

(Respondent) respectfully requests this court to affirm the decision of the
lower court.
Resepctively submitted
Woodbury, Bettilyon & Kesler
Verden E. Bettilyon
Jeffrey K. Woodbury
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